I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical evidence indicates that weak corporate governance is associated with financial reporting fraud (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996 (hereafter DSS) ; Beasley 1996) , but little is known about the actions that fraud firms take to improve their weak governance after fraud detection and, perhaps more importantly, how effectively these actions restore investor trust. Given the importance of the relation between the quality of governance mechanisms and the credibility of the financial reporting system, it is surprising that we know so little about the nature and extent of this relation. This study seeks to fill this gap by investigating the association between the revelation of financial reporting fraud and subsequent improvements in the quality of corporate governance mechanisms and the corresponding economic consequences of such improvements. This evidence is important because the quality of corporate governance is at the forefront of concerns of regulators and corporate management.
Regulators, perhaps in response to the recent flurry of highly publicized financial reporting frauds (e.g., Enron), are considering or have instituted rules intended to strengthen the quality of corporate governance. 1 Much of the debate surrounding these proposals revolves around the idea that stronger governance is associated with more credible financial reporting. Some firms accused of fraud are using a recovery strategy that includes governance improvements. For example, in a recent financial press article (Sorkin 2002) , Edward D. Breen, who was appointed CEO of Tyco following allegations of fraudulent financial reporting there, commented on the state of the quality of corporate governance at Tyco: "The most important thing, in my opinion, when I came into the company, and I've stated this many times, was fixing (emphasis added) corporate governance…" Breen appears to believe that there is a net benefit to improving his firm's governance mechanisms, perhaps in the form of a positive stock price reaction. My findings suggest that improvements in the quality of board composition provide a credible signal to the market regarding the credibility of the financial reporting system. It seems obvious that firms caught committing fraud would take some actions with respect to their governance mechanisms, the most likely of which is to discharge the culprits associated with the fraud. However, it is not as obvious that these firms would necessarily improve their governance after fraud detection because they could merely replace inside directors with other insiders, rather than with outside directors, for example. Moreover, these improvements are costly to firms in terms of time and effort (e.g., Yermack 1996; Klein 2002) and, as Jensen (1993) argues, these costs are prohibitive with respect to establishing internal controls that would eliminate entirely the probability of (future) frauds. Therefore, my first main research objective is to examine whether there is an association between the detection of financial reporting fraud and subsequent improvements in the quality of governance mechanisms. I find that while fraud firms' governance structures are initially weak, by the end of a three-year period following the year of fraud detection these firms have a similar board of director profile and proportion of firms with the combined CEO/COB position to that of their matched control firms. I also find that fraud firms hold more audit committee meetings than their matched control firms by the end of this same period. Overall, these results suggest that improving the quality of governance is important to fraud firms.
Given that regulators are mandating new governance rules and that fraud firms are expending scarce resources on governance improvements after fraud detection, it is important to document whether these improvements provide any economic benefits.
Evidence that governance improvements do indeed provide economic benefits would support the basis for these rules and firms' expenditures on enhanced governance. However, it could very well be the case that these improvements do not provide any economic benefits and are merely window dressing (i.e., non-value enhancing) and thus an inefficient use of resources. Providing evidence on either case adds to our knowledge of the economics of improving the quality of the corporate governance mechanisms that monitor the financial reporting process. My second main research objective, therefore, is to examine whether these improvements aid fraud firms in restoring their reputations and values. Specifically, I examine the relation between improvements that fraud firms make in their boards and audit committees following fraud detection and the corresponding responses of intermediaries, large investors, the market, and analysts. I find a positive relation between increased audit committee activity and institutional investor ownership.
More importantly, I find a positive and economically significant relation between increases in board independence and long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the three-year period following fraud detection. Thus, increasing board independence after fraud detection holds promise as a means of restoring the market's trust in fraud firms.
This study contributes to our knowledge of the link between the credibility of the financial reporting system and quality of governance mechanisms by extending research on the causes and consequences of financial reporting failures (Beasley 1996; DSS; Agrawal et al 1999; Beneish 1999) . First, I document an association between fraud detection and subsequent improvements in outside director percentage and the number of audit committee meetings, and a reduction in the proportion of firms with the combined CEO/COB position. Second, and perhaps most importantly, I provide some evidence that improvements in outside director percentage are important for the recovery of reputation and value following the revelation of financial reporting fraud. This study also provides insights into the agency problem by utilizing a unique setting that provides a rare opportunity to observe agency costs directly and to study the governance measures that firms implement in an attempt to reduce these costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, I provide a brief review of the relevant literature on governance mechanisms and fraud. Section III contains a description of the sample. Section IV contains the research design and empirical results. I summarize and conclude in section V.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
One stream of the accounting literature related to financial reporting fraud examines the association of governance mechanisms and the likelihood of fraud (e.g., ; Beasley 1996) ). DSS find that firms committing financial reporting fraud are more likely to have a board of directors dominated by insiders and are less likely to have an audit committee. However, they do not find that the use of a Big 6 audit firm significantly influences the likelihood of fraud. Beasley (1996) finds that the inclusion of larger proportions of outside members on the board of directors significantly reduces the likelihood of financial reporting fraud, but does not find significant evidence that fraud firms' audit committees meet less frequently. In contrast to DSS and Beasley (1996) , the current study investigates the magnitude and economic consequences of fraud firms' improvements in important monitoring mechanisms during the three-year period following fraud detection.
DSS
There are few extant studies that examine firm responses to fraud detection. In research closely related to the current study, Agrawal et al. (1999) investigate the association of fraud detection and subsequent turnover in senior managers and directors, but fail to find one. Agrawal et al. (1999) examine 103 firms that commit a broad range of frauds, but only four of those firms represent cases of financial reporting fraud. Thus, it is difficult to draw inferences from their study regarding the effect of GAAP violations on governance improvements. Moreover, past research (Karpoff and Lott 1993) finds that mean abnormal returns in a two-or three-day window around fraud detection are significantly more negative in cases of financial reporting fraud than in other cases of fraud. Therefore, incentives to overhaul governance mechanisms may be greater for cases of financial reporting fraud firms than for other cases of fraud. However, this remains an empirical question -one that I examine in this study. Livingston (1997) and Beneish (1999) investigate senior management turnover following the detection of financial reporting fraud. Livingston (1997) finds significant turnover in top managers and financial officers, while Beneish (1999) finds no unusual turnover in senior management. Unlike the Livingston (1997) and Beneish (1999) studies, the current study focuses on the mechanisms intended to oversee managerial actions, rather than on management itself. This is important because agency costs will continue to exist as long there is separation of ownership and control in a firm.
Replacing top management following fraud detection does not get to the root of the problem. As Jensen (1993) notes, "… bad systems or rules, not bad people, underlie the general failings of the board of directors." Therefore, enhancing the quality of governance mechanisms is more likely to ensure that managers do not deviate from their fiduciary duties.
The empirical literature on the economic consequences of governance changes is scant, with no studies using the context of fraud. In fact, the only extant study that provides direct evidence on the market's response to changes in governance is that by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) , who, in a non-fraud setting, find a small positive mean abnormal return over a two-day window centered on the announcement dates of outside director appointments. However, much of the extant research on the association of governance and stock returns finds no significant relation between the level of governance and stock returns. It is also possible that the market will discount or ignore governance changes made by fraud firms because the revelation of fraud has so badly tarnished these firms' reputations. Therefore, our understanding of the economic consequences of governance changes after fraud detection is an open empirical issue that warrants investigation.
III. SAMPLE SELECTION

Fraud Sample
The fraud sample consists of publicly held companies cited in United States "Section 10(b) of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act (of 1934) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder proscribes the making of materially false and misleading statements "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 occur when an issuer makes material misstatements in registration statements, prospectuses or periodic reports filed with the Commission and trading thereafter occurs in the issuer's securities. The filing of false and misleading reports is also a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (of 1934) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder because reports of publicly traded companies affect the markets for offer, sale and purchase of their securities." I use AAERs as a proxy for the occurrence of fraud. Consistent with Beasley (1996) and Bonner et al. (1998) , this proxy is intended to capture extreme cases of fraud in the error-to-fraud continuum. A focus on AAERs is justified because while the SEC cannot possibly investigate every case of fraud, it does target the highest profile cases (Feroz et al. 1991) . Consequently, the fraud sample used in this study is likely to include the most egregious cases of fraud and thus provides a powerful setting to examine the impact of fraud detection on governance improvements because if no effect is found in this setting then it is not likely to be found in any other. However, the use of AAERs has limitations. For example, because the SEC selects cases for which it has the best chance of winning a judgment, they are likely to include instances of the most extreme misleading reporting. Therefore, the results of this study may not be generalizable to the entire population of firms that report fraudulently. I restrict my analyses to frauds that were detected through 1997 to allow for a three-year period after fraud detection in which to examine governance changes. The analysis period is restricted to five years to make data collection more tractable. Table 1 , Panel A reconciles the number of AAERs issued over my analysis period to my final fraud sample. There were 1,357 AAERs issued from 1982 to 2000, 3 of which 1,067 did not involve financial statement fraud, were duplicates or were outside the scope of the analysis period. I was unable to locate proxies or financial statement data for another 195 firms. I include in the final fraud sample each fraud firm that has either proxy statements or SEC Forms 10-K available for at least one year before and at least one year after fraud detection. This sample selection criteria initially leads to 95 firms in the fraud sample, but because I was unable to identify matches for 8 of the fraud firms, the final fraud sample size is 87. Once I identify a firm for inclusion in the fraud sample, I search the Dow Jones database for the period surrounding the fraud period identified in the AAER to determine the fraud detection date. Following Feroz et al. (1991) , if no indication of the fraud detection date appears in Dow Jones, I use the AAER date as a proxy for the detection date. During my review of the AAERs, I carefully examined each one to ensure that the fraud firms identified were cited for false and misleading financial reports.
Moreover, I noted no cases where a firm was cited for violating Rule 10b-5 only for reasons other than the issuance of false or misleading financial statements. Table 1 indicates that fraud firms are widely distributed among industries, with some clustering of firms in machinery and computer equipment, measurement instruments, and business services. Panel C of this Table indicates that 60% of the frauds involved fictitious transactions (i.e., fabricated sales), that, on average, fraud firms overstated their net income by 174%, and that the average length of the fraud was a little more than six quarters.
Panel B of
[Insert Table 1 here]
Control Sample
Prior research (e.g., DSS) and the current study show significant clustering by industry among fraud firms. Therefore, examination of governance changes surrounding fraud detection may reveal characteristic governance behavior that is associated with changes in the industry rather than with fraud detection. To control for this possibility, I use a matched-pairs design to test changes in corporate governance mechanisms following fraud detection.
For each fraud firm, I select a control firm with the same four-digit SIC code, with net sales within ±25% of the fraud firm's net sales for the year preceding fraud detection, and within the same stock exchange. If I cannot find a match within the same four-digit SIC code, I relax my matching criteria to include firms with the same threedigit SIC code, and if necessary, match firms on the basis of a two-digit SIC code. The potential control firm is included in the final matched control sample if there are no reports of fraud in the Dow Jones Database for that firm in the two years before and three years after the fraud detection year of its corresponding fraud firm. Additionally, I search AAERs issued during the analysis period to ensure that the SEC has not cited the potential control firm. The final non-fraud sample consists of 87 firms. Table 2 indicates that fraud and non-fraud firms do not differ significantly based on net sales, market value or exchange listing. 4 Table 2 here]
[Insert
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Changes in Governance Variables
Prior research (Beasley 1996 ; DSS) has established that, compared to matched control firms, fraud firms have weaknesses in several key governance mechanisms.
These weaknesses include boards with lower percentages of outside directors, a higher proportion of firms with the combined CEO/COB position, a lower proportion of firms with audit committees, fewer audit committee meetings, and a smaller percentage blockholder ownership. Other governance mechanisms likely to be important to the financial reporting system include the composition of the audit committee, including its percentage of independent directors and financial experts, the quality of the external audit firm, and the percentage of ownership by managers and directors.
Several empirical studies show that boards composed mainly of outside directors are more effective than boards composed mainly of insiders (e.g., Brickley and James 1987; Weisbach 1988; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990) , and that boards are ineffectual monitors when the board's equity ownership is small and when the CEO is also Chairman of the Board (Jensen 1993) . Agrawal et al. (1999) provide the only empirical study of which I am aware that investigates changes in both senior management and directors after 4 I also test for the difference in age between fraud and control firms and find no statistical difference. fraud detection. They find no significant turnover in either senior management or directors in the three years after fraud detection. However, it is difficult to draw inferences from their study about the detection of GAAP violations as a catalyst for making improvements in governance because their sample included only four GAAP violators. Sommer (1991) suggests that having an audit committee as part of the governance structure and having an effective audit committee are two different matters; further, the audit committee needs to meet on a regular basis without management in order for it to be effective. He also notes that the audit committee, because it has constant access to the internal audit staff, external audit firm, and other corporate personnel, is likely to be the first to identify a potential irregularity. His study supports the notion that there is a positive relation between the number of meetings an audit committee holds and its effectiveness. Beasley (1996) , however, finds no significant difference between fraud and non-fraud firms in the number of audit committee meetings held in the year prior to fraud detection. The Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC) (1999) suggests that the composition of the audit committee is also likely to be critical to its performance. I therefore examine whether the composition of the audit committee differs for fraud and control firms along the dimensions of size, number of outside directors, and number of financial experts.
The extant literature finds no significant difference between fraud and non-fraud firms in audit-firm quality as measured by the use of Big 4 auditing firms versus non-Big 4 firms in the year prior to fraud detection (DSS; Beneish 1997) . Several studies find an association between audit-firm quality and audit-firm size (e.g., DeAngelo 1981). One implication of this finding is that a larger audit firm is likely to be a stronger monitor than a smaller one. Palmrose (1988) suggests that Big 8 (now Big 4) audit firms are sued less frequently than other audit firms because they provide higher quality audits. DeFond (1992) finds a positive relation between audit-firm quality, as proxied by audit-firm size and name brand (i.e., Big 4), and its ability to mitigate agency problems. In sum, these findings suggest that Big 4 audit firms provide better monitoring than other categories of audit firms.
Firms choosing governance mechanisms likely also evaluate their costs. Empirical studies find that internal control improvements are costly to firms in terms of the time and effort required to improve governance (Yermack 1996; Klein 2002) . Moreover, there is a prohibitive cost associated with establishing internal controls that would eliminate entirely the probability of (future) frauds (Jensen 1993) . Notwithstanding these costs, because of the severity of the agency problems of the fraud firms used in this study, it is likely that their costs of not improving governance are greater than their costs of doing so. Economic theory suggests that efforts to repair the financial reporting system must necessarily include significant improvements in its monitoring components. More specifically, agency theory suggests that the demand for monitoring is positively related to the prevalence of agency costs (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983) . Because fraud is a manifestation of acute agency costs, I expect that fraud firms will experience a greater increase in: (i) outside director percentage, (ii) audit committee activity, (iii) audit committee independence, (iv) audit committee financial expertise; (v) audit-firm quality;
and a greater decrease in the proportion of firms with the combined CEO/COB position after fraud detection than will their corresponding control firms over the same period.
Blockholders are also likely to play a key monitoring role (Jensen 1993) , but because they are an external monitoring mechanism, it is difficult to predict changes in their postfraud detection ownership. It is also difficult to predict the change in inside ownership by management and directors given that there is likely to be substantial turnover in both following the detection of fraud. I therefore do not make predictions for changes in the holdings of blockholders, managers or directors.
I first test whether the fraud firms used in this study have a similar governance profile to those used in prior studies. I obtain data on these governance variables from the firm's proxy statement or SEC Form 10K. As reported in Table 3 , Panel A, I find that the mean percentage of outside directors 5 (OS%) in the year preceding fraud detection (Initial) is 47% for fraud firms compared to 56% for control firms, a statistically significant difference (t = -2.54), which is consistent with Beasley (1996) and DSS. This Panel also documents OS% and the numerical increase in outside directors (#OS) with respect to the number of outside directors in Initial. OS% is greater for fraud firms in years 1 through 4, thus providing support for the hypothesis that fraud firms will increase their percentage of outside directors by more than control firms after fraud detection.
#OS is also generally greater for fraud firms than for control firms over the analysis period, although this difference is statistically significant only after year 2. These results suggest that fraud firms improve their reputational capital through the addition of outside directors both in number and proportion, although the decline in the total number of directors accounts for part of this result. 6 Overall, the results indicate an increase of less than one outside director for fraud firms. This may not seem to be a significant increase, but when you consider the difficulty of adding even one outside director in the aftermath of fraud, this result is even more interesting. Perhaps more importantly, the results indicate an increase of almost ten percent in the proportion of outside director representation. I explore the result in subsequent regression analyses.
[Insert Table 3, Panel A here]
As reported in Table 3 , Panel B, I find that the mean number of audit committee meetings (#Meet) for fraud firms in Initial is 1.61, which is statistically smaller than the mean of 1.97 for control firms (t = -1.46). This result contradicts that of Beasley (1996) and likely obtains due to more power in my tests -69 matched pairs in the current study versus 26 matched pairs in the Beasley (1996) study.
[Insert Table 3 , Panel B here] Table 3 , Panel B also provides the cumulative numerical increase in #Meet from its level in Initial to the fourth year afterwards. The change in the mean #Meet is greater for fraud firms than for control firms over the entire analysis period, thus providing support for the hypothesis that fraud firms increase the number of audit committee meetings by more than control firms. The mean #Meet at Final for fraud firms is 3.00 versus 2.33 for control firms. This difference is statistically significant at the 10% level (one-tailed). Overall, fraud firms experience an increase of some 80% in #Meet from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards. It appears that in the wake of fraud 6 The possibility exists that the results obtained for changes in outside director percentage are due to mean reversion. However, changes in outside director percentage require some explicit action by management and therefore are not like other variables, such as returns, where changes can occur without actions directed by management. I thank a reviewer for pointing this out to me. detection the audit committee has at least visibly demonstrated that it is paying more attention to the financial reporting process. Table 3 , Panel B also indicate that fraud firms have significantly fewer financial experts on their audit committees (#FinExp) in Initial, with 0.46 financial experts for fraud firms versus 0.80 financial experts for control firms (t = -2.40). This difference, however, persists at the end of the analysis period. I define a financial expert as one who has accounting or related financial management expertise (i.e., a person who is or has been chief financial officer, or other senior corporate officer with financial oversight responsibility). This definition is consistent with that in the report of the BRC (1999). I also find that while fraud firms have a majority of outsiders on their audit committees (#Aud_OS) in the pre-fraud detection year, there is no difference between fraud and control firms in #Aud_OS in Initial or in any year through the fourth year afterwards. One reasonable interpretation of these results is that although fraud firms' audit committees contained a majority of outsiders and some level of financial expertise, it appears that they did not pay enough attention to the financial reporting process, as evidenced by the fewer number of meetings held in Initial.
Results provided in
Therefore, the number of audit committee meetings appears to be relatively more important than the composition of the audit committee for explaining the likelihood of committing fraud. Table 3 , Panel C indicate that fraud firms have a marginally statistically smaller (t = -1.82) proportion of Big 4 audit firms (Big4) than do control firms in Initial.
Results in
One likely reason that this result contradicts the results in DSS and Beneish (1997) is that the severity of the frauds examined in this study exceeds the severity of the frauds examined in their studies. However, I do find that 75% of fraud firms have a Big 4 auditor in Initial, suggesting that there is relatively little room for monitoring improvement along this dimension for most fraud firms. Therefore, I exclude audit-firm changes from subsequent analyses. 7
[Insert Table 3, Panel C here]
Panel C also indicates that in Initial, 94% of fraud firms have the combined CEO/COB position (CEO=COB) compared to 80% for control firms, a statistically greater proportion (t = 2.79). This result is consistent with that in DSS, who find that 86% of fraud firms have the combined position compared to 74% of control firms in the year prior to fraud detection. I find that by the end of the analysis period fraud and control firms have an indistinguishable difference in this variable. Panel C also reports that fraud firms have a significantly lower percentage of blockholder ownership (BLK%) in Initial (t = -2.05) compared to control firms, consistent with the finding in DSS. This difference disappears by the end of the analysis period, indicating that blockholders increase their holdings in fraud firms. Whether this result is due to improvements in internal governance mechanisms is an issue I explore in subsequent analyses. I also find that while fraud firms and their matched control firms do not differ in the level of the percentage of institutional holdings (INST%) in Initial, fraud firms experience a greater decrease in INST% for each year of the analysis period, but do not differ in INST% at the 7 Untabulated results indicate that at the third year after fraud detection the difference between fraud and control firms relative to their use of Big 4 audit firms persists, with 75% of fraud firms maintaining Big 4 firms versus 88% of the control firms, a statistically significant difference (p=0.03). Overall, fraud firms are more likely than control firms to switch audit firms after fraud detection, but not audit-firm types. In year 1, 25% of fraud firms switch audit firms, compared to 9% of control firms, a statistically significant result (p = 0.00). In the year after fraud detection, 24% of fraud firms switch audit firms, compared to 7% of control firms, again statistically significant (p = 0.00). For fraud firms, the majority of switches occurs within Big 4 firms, with 55% and 62% of the switches in the fraud detection year and year afterwards, respectively. These results imply that in the post-fraud detection period fraud firms were at least able to maintain a high level of audit-firm quality, as measured by Big 4 audit firms. end of the analysis period. The sample size for this variable is very small and one therefore needs to carefully interpret these results. Finally, I find no difference in inside ownership percentage (Inside%) between fraud and control firms in Initial or in any of the four years afterwards.
In sum, I find that, in the year prior to fraud detection, fraud firms exhibit weakness along the governance dimensions of outside director percentage, the number of outside directors, the number of audit committee meetings, the number of financial experts on their audit committees, the quality of the external audit firm, the proportion of firms with the combined CEO/COB position, and the percentage of blockholder ownership. More interestingly, I find that by the end of the three years following fraud detection, fraud firms have indistinguishable differences from their matched control firms in outside director percentage and the proportion with the combined CEO/COB position; they also experience a greater number of audit committee meetings than their matched control firms. Overall, this evidence is consistent with my hypotheses and may indicate that fraud firms wish to report their financial information more credibly. Whether this results in the restoration of fraud firms' reputations and values is an issue that I explore next.
Economic Significance of Governance Changes
The evidence presented thus far in this paper is that, subsequent to fraud detection, fraud firms have a greater increase outside director percentage and audit committee meetings, and a greater decrease in the combined CEO/COB position than their matched control firms. A natural question that then follows concerns the economic significance of these improvements. I examine this issue using signaling theory (e.g., Spence 1973) as a conceptual framework.
Fraud firms have economic incentives (e.g., restoration of lost wealth) to improve governance once fraud is detected and because of information asymmetry must signal that they are serious about restoring the market's trust in their firms. One such signal includes adding independent directors to the board. Jensen (1993) suggests that the board is likely to be more important during crises, when shareholders' interests are in visible danger. Certainly, the period surrounding fraud detection qualifies as a time of crisis. I posit that fraud firms signal that they are serious about dealing with the crisis, in part by correcting a defective governance system through the appointment of outside directors, who are generally viewed by the markets as decision experts, who understand the importance of decision control, and who can work with such decision control systems.
Further, the separation of the combined CEO/COB position is likely to help the board function better (Jensen 1993) . Fraud firms' additions of outside directors and separations of the joint CEO/COB position are therefore intended to signal an intention to report more credibly than in the past. These signals are not costless, however, because of the time and money required to recruit independent directors. 8 The potential benefits to the firm include the reputational capital of the outside director and the associated increase in the perceived credibility of its financial reporting system. Therefore, a priori, it is difficult to predict whether such actions will result in net benefits to the fraud firm.
The net benefits associated with increasing the frequency of audit committee meetings are also not a priori clear. First, there are costs associated with these meetings, including time, travel expenses and directors' meeting fees. There are also potential benefits, including more time for directors to confer and more critically evaluate the financial statements, which is likely to lead to an increase in the perceived credibility of the firm's financial reports.
In sum, improvements in these governance mechanisms are likely to be associated with an increase in the perceived credibility of a firm's financial reports and, implicitly, the credibility of its underlying financial reporting system if the market and others view these signals as credible. 9 An increase in the credibility of a firm's financial reports is likely to improve a firm's reputation, perhaps as evidenced by the firm's ability to raise capital and attract large investors. It is also likely to reduce a firm's investment risk and, therefore, lower a firm's cost of equity capital. Whether this argument holds for my sample of fraud firms is an open empirical question that I examine next.
Responses of Intermediaries and Large Investors to Governance Changes
In this section, I investigate whether improvements in outside director percentage, audit committee activity, and the proportion of firms with the combined CEO/COB position enhance a fraud firm's ability to raise capital and positively impact large investors' ownership of a fraud firm's stock subsequent to fraud detection. Specifically, I test for a relation between these improvements and whether (i) debt and equity issuances increase; (ii) institutional and blockholder ownership increase; and (iii) short sales decrease.
I obtain debt and equity issuance data from Computstat (items # 111 and # 108, respectively). I obtain data on institutional holdings from the CDA Investment Technologies Spectrum database, which is derived from the SEC Form 13F disclosure forms reported quarterly to the SEC. Blockholder holdings are defined as those greater than or equal to 5% and I obtain this data from proxy statements or SEC Form 10K. I hand collect monthly short interest data from the Standard and Poor's Daily Stock Price Record, except as noted for Nasdaq firms for the period subsequent to 1987. For Nasdaq firms, I obtain short interest data for the years subsequent to 1987 directly from the Nasdaq.
As a first step in analyzing the economic consequences of improvements in outside director percentage (OSPCTCH) and audit committee activity (AUDCOMCH) and the reduction in the proportion of firms with the combined CEO/COB position (CEO_COB), I calculate the Pearson Pairwise Correlations between these variables and the intermediation and large investor ones. In the interest of parsimony, I provide only the key results from this analysis, which is presented in Table 4 . While I fail to find a significant relation between OSPCTCH and the intermediation and large investor variables, I do find that AUDCOMCH and changes in institutional and ownership (INST) are positively related. These results are somewhat puzzling given that OSPCTCH is more visible than AUDCOMCH. I also find CEO_COB is negatively related to OSPCTCH, AUDCOMCH, and changes in blockholder ownership (BLK), suggesting that these variables may act as substitutes.
[Insert Table 4 
here]
Although I fail to find a statistically significant relation between outside director percentage improvements and the intermediation and large investor variables, it is possible that such a relation exists for firms that made the most improvements compared to those that made the least such improvements. To investigate this possibility, I divide fraud firms into three groups based on the distribution of outside director changes from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards. Results (untabulated) indicate that the magnitude of changes in outside director percentage does not affect either the amount of capital raised or the ownership activity of intermediaries. 10 I also perform this analysis for audit committee activity changes and find similar results.
One possible explanation for these results is that the governance changes are only a necessary condition for attracting large investors and, given the severity of the frauds and the related fall-out, these investors may be precluded from investing in these firms because of their fiduciary responsibilities to only invest in sound firms. It is very likely, therefore, that the lingering effects of the fraud have kept institutional investors from increasing their ownership in the fraud firms. The result for raising capital is more difficult to interpret given that issuing debt and equity is a joint function of the firm's financing needs and the market's willingness to provide capital. One plausible explanation for the lack of result with respect to short interests is that these positions are likely to close out when the stock hits bottom, which is likely be around the time of fraud detection. At best, this section provides weak evidence that there are economic benefits related to governance improvements. I next investigate the whether these improvements are related to changes in the cost of equity capital.
The Relation between Changes in Governance and Changes in the Cost of Equity Capital
Prior research finds negative abnormal returns in a three-day window surrounding the announcement date of fraud (e.g., Feroz et al. 1991; DSS) . DSS also find a decline in analyst following in the year of fraud detection. These results are consistent with the notion that fraud firms incur an increase in their cost of equity capital after fraud detection. DSS also report that analyst following increases from its level in the fraud detection year in the three years afterwards, but do not ascribe this improvement to any factors. As argued above, if governance improvements are viewed as credible signals, then they ought to positively affect firm value through a decrease in the cost of equity capital. Given the difficulties of directly estimating changes in cost of equity capital for my sample firms (e.g., missing forecasts), I proxy for it using buy-and-hold abnormal returns, which is similar in spirit to the approach used in DSS. That is, increases in returns would be consistent with a decline in the cost of equity capital because returns directly affect the cost of equity capital. Also consistent with DSS, I use analyst following as a proxy for cost of equity capital because if these signals are credible, then investors' beliefs concerning the credibility of the financial reporting system would be raised as evidenced by an increase in analyst following.
Stock Returns
Returns data are obtained from CRSP. I analyze the relation of improvements in the quality of the board of directors and audit committee activity with abnormal returns over the three-year period following fraud detection by estimating the following regression:
where BHAR i, t ≡ The buy-and-hold abnormal return for firm i at time t, where t is as defined below;
OSPCTCH i, t ≡ The lagged change in outside director percentage from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards for firm i at time t, where t is as defined below;
AUDCOMCH i, t ≡ The lagged change in the number of audit committee meetings from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards for firm i at time t, where t is as defined below;
CEO_COB i, t ≡ The lagged change in the proportion of firms with the combined CEO/COB position from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards for firm i at time t, where t is as defined below;
BMV i, t ≡ The book value per share divided by the market value per share for firm i at time t, where t is as defined below. Book and market value are measured as of the end of the year prior to the analysis year. (Source: COMPUSTAT -book value, and CRSP-market value); MVE i, t ≡ Market value of equity per share for firm i at time t, where t is as defined below. Market value is measured as of the end of the year prior to the analysis year (Source: CRSP); and e i, t ≡ the residual for firm i at time t, where t is as defined below.
I compute long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for fraud firm i and matching firm/portfolio m as follows:
where r i,t and r m,t are the annual returns of fraud firm i and benchmark firm/index m, respectively on date t. The BHAR for each fraud firm is computed as the difference between the buy-and-hold returns of the fraud firm and its respective matching firm/index:
The BHARs are computed with respect to (a) matching firms, (b) CRSP equal weighted index, (c) CRSP value weighted index, and (d) CRSP S&P 500 Index. Also, AUDCOMCH is positively correlated with BMV (28.2%) and MVE (19.3%).
Finally, CEO_COB is negatively correlated with MVE (30.2%). In short, these pairwise correlations appear reasonable and do not seem large enough to create multicollinearity problems in the regressions presented in Table 6 . 11
[Insert Table 5 here] 11 I also conduct more formal tests of collinearity on the regressions presented in Table 6 . The highest condition index for any variable was 2.5 (index values above 30 would indicate a collinearity problem). Table 6 presents the results of the regressions of buy-and-hold abnormal returns on the explanatory variables in equation (1). 12 The dependent variable is the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return based on the CRSP equal-weighted index. 13 I use lagged governance variables because most of the changes in the governance variables take place by the end of the second year after fraud detection (see Table 3 ). Results in Table 6 confirm the relative importance of improvements in outside director percentage in explaining abnormal returns. In model 1, the coefficient on OSPCTCH is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level (t=2.65), whereas the coefficient on AUDCOMCH is negative and the coefficient on CEO_COB is positive, but not statistically significant. This finding provides evidence that the market values increases in board independence, and is consistent in spirit with the results in Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) , but is ten times the economic significance of that found in their study. The coefficient on OSPCTCH is 0.022, which implies that a 1% increase in outside director percentage is associated with a 2.2% increase in BHAR, an economically significant result. BMV and MVE are not statistically significant. The Adj R 2 for model 1 is 16.87%. Model 2 is similar to Model 1, except that I omit AUDCOMCH and CEO_COB. I obtain similar results but with slightly lower explanatory power -the Adj R 2 is 16.31%. Model 3 is similar to Model 1, except that I omit OSPCTCH and CEO_COB. The result for the coefficient on AUDCOMCH in Model 3 is the same as in 12 To examine whether firm performance incrementally affects returns, I include controls for firm performance -ROA, lagged ROA, EPS and lagged EPS -with no qualitative difference in the results. I also include variables that interact a yearly dummy with OSPCTCH to assess whether the speed with which governance changes were made had a differential impact on returns. The coefficients on the interaction terms were zero, with no difference among any of the years. 13 Regressions were also run using BHAR based on the CRSP value-weighted and CRSP S&P indices with qualitatively similar results, as well as using the matched-firm approach, with marginally significant results, and are thus not presented.
Model 1, with relatively lower explanatory power (Adj R 2 = 2.33%). Finally, in Model 4, the only governance variable I include is CEO_COB. Its coefficient is again positive and not significant and the Adj R 2 is 0.00%. Thus, AUDCOMCH and CEO_COB do not appear to be important for explaining abnormal returns.
[Insert Table 6 here]
It is possible that the results obtained for Models 1 and 2 are driven by the correlated omitted variable of survivorship bias. That is, the results may be overstated if poorly performing firms are more likely to drop out of the analysis than are those firms that are performing well (or less poorly), and if those poor performers are in the group with the smallest governance change. To test this possibility, I perform a binomial proportions test to determine whether there is a differential survivorship rate for firms in the group with the largest increase in the percentage of outside director representation and for those firms in the group with the smallest such increase. I partition the fraud sample into three equal groups based on the frequency distribution of changes in outside director percentage from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards.
Results ( The results from the regressions need to be interpreted with caution. Analyses based on long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns are fraught with well-established econometric and interpretation issues. 14 However, given that I control for known determinants of returns and that the main result is consistent with signaling theory, this paper does provide some evidence consistent with the notion that increasing outside director percentage subsequent to fraud detection yields substantial economic benefits, namely a decrease in the cost of equity capital in the form of higher abnormal returns.
Analyst Following
I obtain information on analyst following from I/B/E/S. Figure 1 provides evidence on the number of analysts that follow the fraud and control firms for the period beginning one year prior to the fraud detection year and ending three years afterwards.
This Figure indicates that fraud firms experience a significant decline in analyst following in the year of fraud detection, which is consistent with the finding in DSS (1996) . Figure 1 also shows that the difference in analyst following between fraud and control firms persists across the remainder of the analysis period, which is contrary to the finding in DSS. Perhaps this result obtains because the fraud firms in this study are more egregious offenders than the fraud firms in DSS. 15 To investigate the potential relation between improvements in governance and corresponding increases in analyst following, I partition the fraud sample into three equal groups based upon the changes in outside director percentage and audit committee activity from the year prior to fraud detection to the third year afterwards. Results (untabulated) indicate no difference in changes in analyst following between the groups that made the biggest increase versus those that made the smallest increase in outside director representation (t=-1.51, p= 0.13) and audit committee activity (t= -0.98, p= 0.69).
These results imply that changes in outside director percentage and audit committee activity during the three years after fraud detection do not appear to matter for the recovery of analyst following.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This is the first study of its kind that provides evidence on the link between the credibility of the financial reporting system and the quality of governance mechanisms by investigating improvements in these mechanisms subsequent to fraud detection and the corresponding economic consequences of such improvements. Overall, this evidence suggests that fraud firms and, perhaps more importantly, institutional investors and the market view improving the quality of governance mechanisms as a way of restoring trust after fraud.
This study documents that, after fraud detection, fraud firms increase board independence and audit committee activity. I also provide evidence that fraud firms experience a greater reduction in their proportion with the combined CEO/COB position.
This study also investigates the economic consequences of these improvements and finds a positive relation between increases in audit committee activity and institutional holdings. More importantly, it finds a positive and economically significant relation between improvements in outside director percentage and long-run abnormal returns, suggesting that the market views this change as a means of restoring the credibility of the financial reporting system.
My research design, which is intended to include firms most likely to exhibit an increase in governance quality following the detection of financial reporting fraud, necessarily focuses on the most egregious GAAP violators. An issue to be resolved with future research is whether the inferences of this study are generalizable to samples of firms with a broader class of financial reporting credibility problems (e.g., earnings restatements).
FIGURE 1 Mean Analyst Following -Fraud and Control Firms
This figure represents mean analyst following for fraud and control firms for the period beginning one year before the fraud detection year and ending three years afterwards. Year 1 is fraud detection year. 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on one-tailed tests, except for BLK% and INST%, for which no directional predictions are made. a Initial and Final represent the first (pre-fraud detection) and last years of the analysis period, respectively; the variables for these years are measured in levels. b Represent years relative to the pre-fraud detection year (Initial); the variables for these years are measured as changes from Initial.
OS% represents outside director percentage; #OS represents number of outside directors; #DIR represents number of directors; #Meet represents number of audit committee meetings; #AudComMbr represents number of audit committee members; #Aud_OS represents number of outside directors on audit committee; #FinExp represents number of financial experts on audit committee; Big4 represents proportion of firms with Big4 audit firms; CEO_COB represents proportion of firms with the combined CEO/COB position; BLK% represents percentage of shares held by >5% blockholders; INST% represents the percentage of shares held by institutions that file SEC Form 13F; and Inside% represents the percentage of shares held by management and directors. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
OSPCTCH ≡ Change in outside director percentage from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards; AUDCOMCH ≡ Change in the number of audit committee meetings from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards; CEO_COB≡ change in the proportion of fraud firms with the combined CEO/COB position from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards; INST ≡ change in the percentage of stock owned by institutions filing SEC Form 13F from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards; SHORT ≡ change in the short position from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards; NEWEQUITY ≡ mean amount of new equity issued in the three years subsequent to fraud detection; NEWDEBT ≡ mean amount of new debt issued in the three years subsequent to fraud detection; and BLK ≡ change in the percentage of stock owned by >5% owners from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards. 
MVE 100%
**,*** Significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. *,**,*** Significant at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
BHAR ≡ The buy-and-hold abnormal return using equal weighted index; OSPCTCH ≡ The lagged change in outside director percentage from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards; AUDCOMCH ≡ The lagged change in the number of audit committee meetings from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards; CEO_COB≡ lagged change in the proportion of fraud firms with the combined CEO/COB position from the pre-fraud detection year to the fourth year afterwards; BMV ≡ The book value per share divided by the market value per share; and MVE ≡ Market value of equity per share. .
